Farzad Taheripour, Thomas W. Hertel, and Navin Ramankutty

PNAS September 17, 2019 116 (38) 19193-19199

Significance

The rapid expansion of oil palm in Malaysia and Indonesia (M&I) has contributed to record levels of deforestation, carbon emissions, and biodiversity loss. Sustainability certification schemes seeking to address this problem have fallen short of their stated goals, leading to calls for more aggressive measures. Here we explore 3 alternative conservation policies within a global economic framework and find that market-mediated responses confound the efficacy and distributional impacts of these policies. We suggest that simply limiting palm oil production or consumption is unlikely to halt deforestation in M&I in the absence of active forest conservation incentives. We also find that M&I would benefit economically by taking domestic action rather than waiting for others to act.

Abstract

The global demand for palm oil has grown rapidly over the past several decades. Much of the output expansion has occurred in carbon- and biodiversity-rich forest lands of Malaysia and Indonesia (M&I), contributing to record levels of terrestrial carbon emissions and biodiversity loss. This has led to a variety of voluntary and mandatory regulatory actions, as well as calls for limits on palm oil imports from M&I. This paper offers a comprehensive, global assessment of the economic and environmental consequences of alternative policies aimed at limiting deforestation from oil palm expansion in M&I. It highlights the challenges of limiting forest and biodiversity loss in the presence of market-mediated spillovers into related oilseed and agricultural commodity and factor markets, both in M&I and overseas. Indeed, limiting palm oil production or consumption is unlikely to halt deforestation in M&I in the absence of active forest conservation incentives. Policies aimed at restricting palm oil production in M&I also have broader consequences for the economy, including significant impacts on consumer prices, real wages, and welfare, that vary among different global regions. A crucial distinction is whether the initiative is undertaken domestically, in which case the M&I region could benefit, or by major palm oil importers, in which case M&I loses income. Nonetheless, all policies considered here pass the social welfare test of global carbon dioxide mitigation benefits exceeding their costs.

See https://www.pnas.org/content/116/38/19193

Figure 1: Impacts of TAX (Left) and TAXAREA (Right) on crop harvested area (Top) and land cover (Bottom). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.